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3I. INTRODUCTION
This paper2 analyzes effects of Europeanisation beyond the EU and it focuses
on a particular institution: the national governments of two Eastern European
countries – Moldova and Ukraine – that do not have a credible accession perspective.
Europeanisation of domestic executive is a new,  and small, but in the same time , a
tremendously growing research area (Sedelmeier, 2006, p. 1). Scholars in this field
focus mainly on member and candidate states , particularly on Central and Eastern
European (CEE) countries. Nevertheless, adjustment of political -administrative
structures occurs also beyond the EU borders (Wolczuk, 2004, p. 1). It is particularly
worthy of mentioning states form the European Economic Area (EEA). Also, as a
result of the recent development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), as an
alternative to enlargement, (Dannreuther, 2006) the EU’s Southern and Eastern
neighbours should be considered as well.
The scope of this paper is twofold. First, to contribute to Europeanisation
debate. Second, the paper aims to shed more light on the impact of Europeanisa tion
on domestic politico-administrative structures beyond EU candidacy, bringing
examples from core executive adjustment in Moldova and Ukraine.
2 I owe special acknowledgements to Arcadie Barbăroşie, Valeriu Gheorghiu, Emanuelle Itoh, Jane
O’Mahoney, Oleh Protsyk, Valeriu Prohniţchi, Liliana Viţu and many others who, deliberately or not,
contributed greatly to the development of this paper.
4A. RATIONALE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The former Soviet Union republics Moldova and Ukraine gained their
independence in 1991. After a tumultuous transition period they, however, did not
catch the 2004 enlargement wave that included three other former soviet republics,
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. For the time being , Moldova and Ukraine proved to be
the only countries from the so-called Western New Independent States (WNIS) 3 that
expressed their strong wish to join the EU. Their demarche is supported by the
announced readiness to implement necessary reforms thus following the way of
former Eastern candidates. A lthough they do not have a clear membership
perspective, both are involved in implementation of the ENP instruments which are
clearly moulded on the enlargement process (Kelley, 2006, p. 30). Besides the
socialisation component, which emerges from the dire ct neighbourhood of the EU,
the very presence of enlargement institutional patterns creates certain elements of
political conditionality. As a result of the above mentioned factors, domestic
executives encounter structural and functional adjustments and th ey imitate to some
extent national governments of candidate countries.
How uniform and durable is this process? To what extent and how the EU’s
‘transformational diplomacy’ and post communist legacy is shaping the process?
What is the raison d’être and finalite of Europeanisation of governance in these two
countries? Where this institutional adaptation could lead to? These are the questions
addressed in this research .
B. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Choosing a theoretical approach to suit the purpose of this research is a
difficult task. First of all, the approach should rely on new institutionalism ( Hall and
Taylor, 1996, cited in Gwiazda, 2002, p. 7) , as it focuses on institutional adjustment
as a result of domestic impact of Europe. The di fficulty appears when selecting one of
its varieties. One distinguishes three distinctive approaches for analysis: historical,
3 WNIS include former republics of the Soviet Uni on that have a common border with the EU:
Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.
5rational and sociological institutionalism. Historical institutionalism  traditionally
applies to the study of the impact of the EU on executive governance (see, for
example, Laffan, 2003, p. 5). Even though the time frame the paper focuses on is
quite reduced – generally starting since countries’ independence and particularly
since the conclusion of bilateral action plans within the  ENP – there is still enough
room for tracking structural adjustments within executives . Sociological
institutionalism (or constructivism) seems to be the appropriate framework for
analysis as it follows a ‘logic of appropriateness’ ( March and Olsen, 1998) and it
involves adaptation through socialization and learning. Indeed, the EU applies to
Moldova and Ukraine predominantly cognitive and normative mechanisms (Gwiazda,
2002, p. 8) of Europeanisation. On the other hand,  candidate countries are entrenched
within political conditionality, and they follow the ‘logic of consequences’ of the
rational institutionalism (March and Olsen, 1998). Although these two approaches
use distinct mechanisms, they complement each other which is confirmed by the EU
behaviour, which never relies on conditionality only (Sedelmeier, 2006, p. 10).
Unfortunately, the EU never promised membership to Moldova and Ukraine, and it
did not explicitly rule it out either. Therefore, over time, their relations with EU will
involve more conditionality and one could anticipate that research in this field will
increasingly need a rational approach. Assuming that persuasive tactics dominate the
relations of the EU with these two countries, sociological institutionalism remains the
main theoretical framework for this paper. Therefore, in order to capture a full picture
of consequences of institutional changes  and to draw similarities between Moldova
and Ukraine and candidate  countries, one will have recourse to both rational and
historical institutionalism.
The methodology used is analytical and comparative. This is a qualitative
research that implies interpretative methods of analysis of official governmental
documents on central public administration reform and policies of both Moldova and
Ukraine combined with an academic literature review. Comparison is used also  to
show differences between member states and these two countries . Both case studies
on executive reforms involve identification of similarities, differences, successes and
of potential challenging areas within national governments that might delay the
Europeanisation process. A focus on Europeanisation of Moldova and Ukraine at
country level, or at some particular field level would add an important contribution to
6the central debate of this topic. However, the research will concentrate on core
executive structures, processes and agents (Laffan, 2003, p. 5) liable to adjustments
under the EU influence only.
C. GEOGRAPHICAL FOCUS
Why focus on Moldova and Ukraine? Despite immense differ ences in territory
and population,4 these countries have been grouped together for several reasons. First,
they have a common past – both are former Soviet Union republics. Second, both are
neighbours, and since recently – direct EU neighbours. Moreover, b oth are land
neighbours as opposite to EU’s Southern neighbours. While both are European states
and partner countries within the ENP and subsequently both are beyond the EU
candidacy, according to the Treaty of the European Union, they could request to
advance their status. Third, both found themselves in a situation of double exclusion.
Neither of these two was invited to  join the EU while having to face economic and
political pressures coming from Russia. Nevertheless, contrasting from the other two
WNIS – Belarus and Russia – Moldova and Ukraine expressed their strong wish to
become EU members. Fourth, in terms of political regime, immediately after
independence both chose semi -presidentialism with a strong popularly elected
president enjoying extensive p owers, and both recently shifted towards semi -
parliamentarism. The list is not exhaustive, one could continue, for example, with the
Transnistrian conflict at the Moldovan -Ukrainian border where the EU is recently
involved through finding a peaceful conflict settlement. It has been suggested even
that the main rationale of the ENP is to offer an alternative to enlargement
particularly to Moldova and Ukraine: ‘Ukraine together with Moldova is the only
country that really needs a new policy of the EU, no othe r Wider Europe country
needed it and for all of them the concept looked at least artificial’ ( CPCFPU, 2004, p.
6).
4 Moldova has a territory of 33.7 thousands sq km and a population of nearly 4 millions inhabitants,
while Ukraine has 603.7 thousands sq km and counts a 46 millions population .
7D. OUTLINE
1. Chapters breakdown
The next chapter explores the conceptual framework. It examines the concept
of Europeanisation as a var iety of political conditionality and how it could be applied
to executive adaptation of countries in the proximity of the EU. The second major
issue of this chapter tackles the ENP concept as a normative framework for
Europeanisation beyond the EU. The fol lowing two chapters are analytical and are
focused on Europeanisation of core executive structures, processes and agents in
Moldova and Ukraine. The last chapter is comparative and aims to explore
similarities, differences, successes and problems in adapta tion of core executives in
these two countries.
2. Main arguments
There is much more functional EU pressure on Moldovan and Ukrainian core
executives than on other two Eastern neighbours – Belarus and Russia. The first two
countries are better engaged i n the ENP by signing its main instruments – bilateral
EU-country action plans. These documents are structured similar to association
agreements, thus offering an official framework for transposing the acquis
communautaire into national legislation. Moreove r, while drawing the ENP, similar
patterns with those used for eastward enlargement were used (Dannreuther, 2006,
Cremona, 2004). As a result, the European neighbourhood concept is modelled on
enlargement process and the two governments are implementing Eu ropean policies
and adjusting theirs structures in order to deal efficiently with European affairs. This
fact means that in certain situations they  behave similar to candidate state
governments. The policy of sharing with these two countries everything exc epting EU
institutions leads to an inevitable convergence of administrative structures and
procedures with those of EU member states. This process, however, is quite dispersed
because the existent framework encourages governments to be selective, i.e. to
implement some convenient reforms, while others, more important, are neglected.
The conclusion is that the Europeanisation of executive governance in Moldova and
8Ukraine will remain a fragmented process, as long as the main rationale of EU’s
political conditionality – an open perspective for a full EU membership – is absent.
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. EUROPEANISATION AS A VARIETY OF POLITICAL
CONDITIONALITY
Burgeoning of research on Europeanisation coincided with collapse of
communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and with coming into use of domestic
politicians of slogans ‘return to Europe’ and ‘Europeanisation’ in order to justify
more or less painful reforming of their countries (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore,
2003, p. 6-7). Despite its fashionability (O lsen, 2003, p. 334, Featherstone, 2003, p.
3), Europeanisation is one of those ‘essentially contested concepts’ which is no
wonder since debates on what ‘Europe’ means are not new (Gwiazda, 2002, p. 7).
One should admit that given its novelty, Europeanisat ion is quite an ambiguous term
and still leaves room for various interpretations. The purpose of this paragraph is to
review the essence of Europeanisation as a form of political conditionality and to
clarify how it will be used in this paper.
Given its predominantly technical nature, research on political conditionality
is mostly case-focused and often descriptive (Zanger, 2000, p. 295). Barnes and
Randerson (2006, p. 351) proposed a generally applicable definition of conditionality:
‘the exercise of policy instruments by one party to secure compliance and shape the
actions of another party.’ The drawback of this definition is the ambiguity in
identifying the main actors of ‘conditionality game’. Charillon (2004, p. 258) brings
more light into this issue de fining conditionality as ‘linking, by a state or the
international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid or trade
concession), to the fulfilment of economic and political conditions’. This definition
exemplifies with conditional ity instruments, making clear that conditionality could be
political and economic, and that it could stem from a state or an international
organisation. The bias of such a definition is that it does not include the EU, as it is
9neither a state, nor an inte rnational organisation. However, it does not exclude that a
source for conditionality could be a group of states.
Political conditionality  represents a set of requirements that developing
countries have to fulfil as a response to international donor’s deve lopment assistance
in order to strengthen the implementation of good governance principles. This does
not necessarily mean financial aid only. To look at the EU example, political
conditionality could involve as well access to further stages of integration  or
cooperation; importing legislative and institutional templates; advice and technical
assistance a.o. (Grabbe, 2001, p. 1020).
There is a broad agreement of students of European integration that by the end
of 1980s EU’s external policies shifted from ap olitical content to conditionality and
especially towards political conditionality (Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 11). Before the
falling of the Berlin Wall in 1989, international organisations used conditional levers
sporadically and selective ly only, relevant examples being Greece, Portugal and
Spain. The end of the Cold War revealed a systemic need to support the n ewly
emerged democracies in CEE. This  resulted in a more consistent application of
political conditionality and this paved the way for ten of the post-communist
countries5 to join the EU. These developments made of membership conditionality
the most powerful foreign policy instrument of the EU (Smith, 2003 p. 108) and
provided the necessary instruments for Europeanisation of candidate, ‘quasi -
candidate’ (Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 11) and countries which do not have a clear
membership perspective.
In social sciences literature on Europeanisation one could distinguish two big
debates: what Europeanisation means and through what mechanisms it becomes
effective. Within the earliest definitions of Europeanisation, the one proposed by
Robert Ladrech (1994, p. 12) is the definition cited the most. According to him,
Europeanisation means a ‘process of reorienting the direction and shape of politics to
the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the
organizational logic of national politics and policy -making’. As Howell (2004, p. 1)
confirms, ‘in its most explicit form Europeanization is conceptualised as the process
of downloading EU regula tions and institutional structures to the domestic level.’
5 In 2004 - Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and in
2007 – Bulgaria and Romania.
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A common point of reference for both widely cited definitions are domestic
consequences of European integration. It seems that this is the most common
understanding of the term both in research and in public discourse.
Another well-known scholar of Europeanisation Claudio Radaelli (2003, p. 3)
considers that it is more appropriate to point out what Europeanisation is not, and
distinguishes it from other concepts, namely convergence, harmonisation, integration,
and policy formation. Moreover, he goes further and add s value to the above
mentioned conceptualisations proposing a broader definition which could pretend to a
commonly agreed one. Thus, he ascertains that Europeanisation is :
‘a process of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal
and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing
things, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated
in the making of EU public policy and p olitics and than incorporated in the
logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public
policies’.
Others attempted to systematize Eauropeanisation’s different senses as well.
Thus, Olsen (2003, pp. 333-346) identified five meanings: (I) the territorial expansion
of Europe’s (or EU’s) borders, or, in other words, enlargement; (II) European -level
institutionalisation; (III) the export of European institutions to the rest of the world;
(IV) strengthening the political component of the  European integration project, and
(V) the impact of European-level institutions at the national level. Featherstone
(2003, p. 5) also develops a typology of Europeanisation identifying four broad
categories: (I) a historical process; (II) a matter of cult ural diffusion; (III) a process of
institutional adaptation; and (IV) as adaptation of policy and policy processes.
Europeanisation is a ‘multifaceted concept’ (Quaglia et al, 2006, p. 406) and it
is argued that it ‘lost any precise meaning’ (Kassim, 2000,  p. 235). However most of
the proposed definitions feature several similarities. First, obviously, all of them
assume a transformation. Second, Europeanisation is seen rather as a process than a
status (Lenschow, 2006, p. 57). Third, the primary focus of E uropeanisation is the
EU, (Gwiazda, 2002, p. 9) with other synonyms used: ‘EU -isation’, (Radaelli, 2003,
p. 27), ‘EU Europeanisation’, ‘Unionisation’, ‘Communiation’, (Goetz, 2001 in
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Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2003, p. 7). This approach fits into the so -called ‘top-
down’ (from the EU towards national states) approach in studying Europeanisation.
However, when it comes to other directions of work of Europeanisation (national
state – EU (bottom-up), state – state (horizontal) and national state – EU – national
state (round-about)(Lenschow, 2006, p. 57) it is important to clarify what a ‘state’
means in all these cases. Although most researchers tend to focus on member states,
and recently on candidate countries, states beyond the EU candidacy have also
experienced the impact of the EU. ‘ Europeanisation can also be exported’ confirm
Papadimitriou and Phinnemore (2003, p. 4). Here, again, Radaelli (2003, p. 27)
features his tendency towards generalization and uses an alternative term
‘Europeification’, thus geographically extending the research area. Some authors
(Goetz, 2000; Grabbe 2003; Dimitrova, 2002)  examine the ‘Eastern style’
Europeanisation, where it is considered as a synonym of ‘Westernisation’ for CEE
states (Agh, 1999). Despite the impressive numbe r of definitions of Europeanisation,
in general terms they complement each other, and more important, they do not
exclude each other (Olsen, 2002).
Moving from the question of ‘what Europeanisation is?’ to ‘how
Europeanisation works?’ could bring more clar ity on the purpose of this research.
Thus, the meaning of Europeanisation in this paper is the impact of the EU on
domestic institutions, i.e. Europeanisation of polity.
B. EXECUTIVE ADAPTATION
Obviously, the EU membership is Europeanising many aspects  of domestic
political life. Grabbe (2001, p. 1014) identifies Europeanisation as ‘the impact of the
EU accession process on national patterns of governance’. The study of EU’s impact
on domestic institutions is a distinctive branch of Europeanisation research. Usually
the focus in this field is public administration generally, locally, regionally or
centrally; national government, civil service, parliaments, courts. In other words, all
three branches of power: executive, legislative and judicial are closel y scrutinized by
researchers on Europeanisation.
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The executive governance  is a term that defines the executive branch from the
classical Montesque’s theory of separation of powers. It concerns not only institutions
that execute laws (i.e. cabinet ministers  and subordinated institutions, and presidential
institutions in certain presidential republics) passed by parliament, but it concerns
their working style and the way they interact with society as well. The terms
legislative governance  and judicial governance are used as well in social science
literature. The core executive is the main actor that manages European affairs at
national level and ensures the link between domestic and European policy . Thus,
executives are first institutions to face effects of Europeanisation.
As the present paper focuses on institutional adaptation as a consequence of
the EU influence beyond its borders, a fair question would be: ‘why executive?’ This
question has several answers. Executive reforms represent a part of wider insti tutional
reforms that Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999 cited in Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2003,
p. 6) have linked with Europeanisation. First, speaking about member states , it is
considered that ‘national governments occupy the most privileged position in the EU,
as they negotiate treaty changes, set the EU’s medium term goals, and adopt or reject
European legislation in the EU Council’ (Quaglia et al, 2006, p. 411). Called by
Genschel (2001, p. 98) ‘translator devices’ because ‘they translate EU requirements
into domestic laws and regulations in order to make domestic policy compatible with
EU policy’, executives have a privileged role in comparison with legislatures and
courts (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2003, p. 6). Goetz (2003, p. 70) even
advances the concept of the ‘Europe of executives’. Executives play a central role in
accession process of candidate countries but adaptation of executive structures is
rather a deliberate decision of members and candidates than an explicit requirement
of the EU (Sedelmeier, 2006, p. 15). One could say that within national institutions,
executives are the most affected (by European integration) structures. The national
coordination systems for management of European affairs that both members and
candidates have created in  order to cope with European integration institutional
pressures affect almost everything: structures (institutional design of national
administration), processes (the way executives operate) and personnel (civil servants).
Thus, the way executives respond  to changes has a significant impact on the nature of
Europeanisation of national public policy.
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What about European countries for which, for the time being, membership is
ruled out, but have a strong connection with the EU? Referring to the focus of this
paper, Moldova and Ukraine, why executive governance would be an appropriate
field in order to research the effects of Europeanisation? The answer is twofold. First,
as one can see further, the ENP puts on these countries institutional pressures similar
with those for candidate states. Second, as one saw above, the EU does not have
specific requirements about how national administrations should look and act. The
general architecture of the national government and the way it works and interacts
with other institutions is a matter of administrative culture and constitutional
provisions at domestic level. The EU lacks an ‘administrative acquis’, which is
replaced by the so-called obligation de résultat – principle of obligatory results and
occasionally by jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (OECD/SIGMA,
1998a). In this respect, the reason why the Moldovan and Ukrainian executives are
scrutinized in this paper is the fact that in many fields they face the same adaptation
pressures as candidate countrie s without having an explicit signal from the EU about
their membership perspective.
C. NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK: THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD
POLICY
Any international actor influences behaviours of both those who accept or
deny the established normative order . The question of how and why norms influence
states behaviour in international relations has become a central issue for debates
among researchers (Park, 2006). Increasing attention is paid to a relatively new
concept ‘normative power Europe’ (Manners, 200 2). Researchers generally avoid
formulating a definition of ‘normative power’. Some authors admit that it could be
rather an analytical tool, appropriate for analysing EU policies, than a special type of
power, different from ‘military power’, ‘economic po wer’ etc. (Sjursen, 2006b, p.
170). Manners (2002) suggests that ‘normative power’ is ‘the ability to shape
conceptions of “normal” in international relations’. What normality means, though,
could be differently understood and interpreted by international actors. As this
definition leaves margins for interpretations, other authors indicated the need for a
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further elaboration (Diez, 2005). A more comprehensive definition, which enumerates
the main features of the EU ‘normative power’ is offered by Juncos (20 04, p. 1): ‘a
normative power would be characterised by the centrality of civilian instruments
(economic, financial and diplomatic tools); the use of force as the last resort, being
possible and necessary in specific circumstances; and the promotion throug h its
external action of democratic values, multilateralism, and regional cooperation as the
main feature of the EU’s external action.’ Enumerating could bring more light on this
issue, although it can also raise claims about its exhaustibility.
Reviewing debates in the social science literature one could say that a
‘normative power’ is a ‘soft power’ par excellence (Hyde Price, 2001, p. 117) – as
opposed to ‘hard power’ – although it is not clear whether it is so deliberately, or
because it has no coercive  capabilities (Sjursen, 2006b). This does not mean that a
‘normative power’ would not use force, but the latter could be applied only when the
whole reserve of peaceful -civilian instruments (diplomacy, persuasion, negotiation,
compromise) is exhausted. A ‘normative power’ would prefer long term anticipating
measures of conflict preventing as opposed to short term armed coercion. It includes
and complements the ‘civilian power’. Besides the civilizing tools it has an important
‘ideational dimension’ (Manners , 2002, p. 239) meaning diffusion of ideas, norms,
principles, values. ‘Normative power’ could be broadly applied to any international
actor because any of them may adopt normative approaches, but traditionally is
attributed to the EU, given its originalit y as international actor. As Manners points
out, ‘normative power Europe’ […] ‘exists as being different to pre -existing political
forms and this particular difference pre -disposes it to act in a normative way’
(Manners, 2002, p. 241).
So, what is the ENP, and how different is norms diffusion through this policy
from membership conditionality? From the very beginning the ENP was conceived as
an ‘eastern initiative’ – a compromise between inclusion and exclusion of WNIS.
Thus, in 2002, with the UK as one of its main promoters, the ‘Wider Europe’
initiative was launched, focusing on Eastern European neighbours of the EU: Belarus,
Moldova, Russia and Ukraine 6 (Smith, 2005, p. 759). It did include neither former
soviet republics from Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) nor
6 Belarus and Ukraine became EU’s direct neighbours at the same time with the 2004 enlargement, and
Moldova in 2007, after the last two countries – Bulgaria and Romania – joined the EU.
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Mediterranean neighbours ( Ibidem). Countries from Western Balkans and Turkey,
whose candidate status is not clear for how long it is going to last , were not
considered neighbours, and subsequently, are not the aim of the ENP. Th e
Copenhagen European Council endorsed the initiative in December 2002, but
approved also the proposal of Southern member states (mainly France and Italy) to
extend the ENP to Mediterranean neighbours: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Palestinian Authority.
Commission’s communication: ‘Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A New Framework
for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’, (Commission, 2004)
endorsed later by the European Council, was released in Ma rch 2003. The ENP
Strategy Paper released in May 2004 contains its main objectives: to develop a ‘ring
of friends’ who would support the EU in spreading its values and norms and in
maintaining stability and security along its external borders while not off ering to
these friends the membership ‘carrot’. It was emphasized that the ENP does not
replace, but complement existing agreements (Euro -Mediterranean and Partnership
and Cooperation agreements) and financial aid instruments (MEDA and TACIS). In
June 2004, after the ‘Roses’ Revolution’ in Georgia, the EU satisfied endeavours of
Southern Caucasian republics to join the ENP.
Returning to the region which is the focus of this research, from the very
beginning Moldova and Ukraine tried to obtain a differenti ated approach, showing
their interest for a closer integration. First, one could say that geographically they are
the only ‘willing’ partner countries within the ENP that could have a claim on the fact
they are European states, and according to treaties, c ould aspire to the EU
membership. Russia declined participation in the ENP and opted for a bilateral
partnership on equal basis which presupposes developing of four common spaces
with the EU (economic; freedom, security and justice; external security; and research
and education). Belarus, although is formally a partner country, given its internal
problems with human rights, is not connected yet to primary ENP instruments –
Action Plans (APs). After negotiation, usually APs have an implementation period of
five years. However, Moldova and Ukraine insisted on a three years implementation
term, given their membership aspirations. The APs are often criticised because their
occasional ambiguity in determining the part responsible for accomplishment of
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actions, non-measurable outcomes and lack of clearly stipulated deadlines (Smith,
2005, p. 764).
How does the ENP and its main instrument – APs, relate to our research?
According to the ENP concept, improving the effective functioning of public
institutions, with a view to ensuring high standards of administrative efficiency, is a
shared interest between the EU and partner countries (ENP Strategy Paper, 2004).
Moreover, it has been argued that the ENP ‘was largely developed in path
dependency with enlargement policy [ …] copying key instruments and procedures of
the pre-accession strategy while ruling out membership’ (Lippert, 2006, p. 87), an
approach confirmed by Kelley (2006, p. 31). This claim is quite well documented.
First, APs are moulded on association agreement s with candidate countries (Cremona,
2004). The reason is that the ENP is an extension and adaptation of Commission’s
active foreign policy role during enlargement and it has largely been conceptualized
within DG Enlargement, by the same officials who work ed on enlargement. Only
recently it was transferred to the DG External Relations (Kelley, 2006, p. 31 -34).
Second, this is not only reflected in copying institutional and structural
enlargement templates, but it is reflected at conceptual level as well: conditionality
and socialisation strategies were used both for enlargement and the ENP (Kelley,
2004).
Third, the future prospects indicate strengthening of this approach. Thus, the
European Commission examines the prospects by which ENP partner countries co uld
benefit from association or even from full participation in EU agencies and
community programs. This proposal was supported by the European Council in
March 2007 (Emerson, Noutcheva and Popescu, 2007, p.13). It is even anticipated an
advanced institutional participation (as observers in the European Parliament and the
Economic and Social Committee) for ENP countries that could presumably sign
enhanced agreements (Ibidem).
D. LITERATURE REVIEW
The social science literature related to research question s could be divided
into several distinct groups. First, it is necessary to mention that papers touching
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topics similar with those addressed in this research are extremely rare. Studies
examining Europeanisation of executive governance in Moldova are absent . As
regards to Ukraine, there is a recent research of Kataryna Wolczuk (2007) that
addresses ‘Europeanisation further East’ and that examines the impact of the EU on
Ukrainian domestic institutions. There is also an article that explores the capacity of
the ENP to promote political reforms. Thus, Judith Kelley (2006) attempts to find
whether the policy of sharing with neighbours ‘everything but institutions’ would
motivate them to implement democratic and human rights reforms. An important
conclusion that author draws and which is substantiated by significant arguments is
that it is unlikely that the ENP would be an efficient agent for promoting reforms in
the European neighbourhood, because of absence of membership per spective. The
paper also examines political conditionality and path -dependency concepts,
concerning Eastern European neighbours , which is relevant to this research topic. In
the same category, Dimitris Papadimitriou (2003) examines Europeanisation of
administrative structures through instituti onal twinning beyond the EU. There are
many studies tackling different aspects of the ENP:  Roland Dannreuther (2006),
Rutger Wissels (2004), Karen E. Smith (2005), E. Johansson -Nogués (2005), Susanne
Milcher, Ben Slay and Mark Collins (2006), Barbara Lipp ert (2006), John
Lowenhardt, Ronald J. Hill and Margot Light (2001), but they relate to a limited
extent to this research, which is more narrowed -down. Emerson, Noutcheva and
Popescu (2007) examine perspectives of an added value to the current ENP strategy ,
proposing an ‘ENP plus’ concept. Of a particular interest are their proposals for a
deeper involvement of partner countries within the EU institutions, in particular with
the EU agencies. Usually ENP researchers concentrate on Ukraine, because it is
considered ‘the most vocal state in the neighbourhood proclaiming its desire to join
the EU’ and ‘the EU’s leading partner in the Eastern neighbourhood’ (Emerson,
Noutcheva and Popescu, 2007, p. 24).
Second, it is necessary mentioning the group of sources focu sing on
Europeanisation. Regarding the nature of the research, there should be distinguished
two types of papers in this category: conceptual literature and papers concentrated on
Europeanisation of public administration in general and of core executives i n
particular. One of the most comprehensive reviews of existing trends in defining
Europeanisation of CEE countries, and identifying gaps in this research area is
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provided by the paper ‘Europeanisation in new member and candidate states’ by
Ulrich Sedelmeier (2006). In the same series, ‘Living reviews in European
governance’, Frank Schimmelfenning (2007) in his work:  ‘EU governance beyond
the European Union’, puts himself in position of a sceptical reader asking ‘is there
Europeanisation beyond Europe?’ The paper seeks to systematize the literature on EU
influence beyond member and candidate states. This review, however, focuses on
three distinctive areas of Europeanisation beyond Europe: regionalism, democracy
and human rights. One of Schimmelfenning’s find ings is that literature on the EU
impact beyond Europe often does not use the term ‘ Europeanisation’. At best it is
featured in books and articles titles while within text it is substituted by other
‘favourite concepts’ like ‘civilian’ or ‘normative power’ . Europeanisation related to
CEE member states constitutes also the concern of Heather Grabbe (2002). Among
others, of a particular interest in this work are the findings about real boundaries of
the EU order as well as analysis whether theoretical and emp irical studies on
Europeanisation in the EU-15 could be usefully applied to Eastern European
candidate countries. There is no a wide research on EU impact on Belarus, Moldova
and Ukraine (Wolczuk, 2004, p. 1).
Markus Haverland (2005) examines theoretical approaches and methodologies
used while researching Europeanisation, both within Member States and non -
members, and this is relevant from the point of view of choosing the appropriate
methodology. An important contribution in order to identify existent app roaches in
defining Europeanisation is made by Borzel and Risse (2003), Featherstone and
Radaelli (2003), Howell (2004), Lenshow (2006), Olsen (2003).
As regards to literature assessing the EU impact on national administrations, it
should be mentioned SIGMA papers (OECD/SIGMA, 1998a,b), which provide
substantiation of Europeanisation of public administration and development of its
institutions, such as European Administrative Space and common European
principles for public administration. Of course, as the present research is focused on
one national institution only, there is a particular interest in analysing literature on
adaptation of domestic executives. One of the most significant in this field is the
comparative analysis on impact of the EU on executiv e government focused on six
member states performed by Brigid Laffan (2003). The work is important because of
two aspects. First, it provides an overview of the existent literature on core executive
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adjustment. Second, it offers a framework for analysis, w hich is suitable for the
present paper. Thus, the research is focused on adaptation structures, procedures and
agents (civil servants) within core executives of six member states that are mostly
exposed to adaptation pressures. Two other papers refer to me mbership negotiations
as a shaping power for Europeanisation of CEE candidate states (Barbara Lippert,
Gaby Umbach, Wolfgang Wessels, 2001 and Danica Fink-Hafner, 2005). Relevance
of these works is related to  possibly identifying patterns between former candidates
and Moldova and Ukraine. Andrew Jordan (2003)  looks on what has been deeper
Europeanised: domestic policies or national governments. In his work Genschel
(2001) examines national governments through optic of ‘key translator devices’
between national and European levels. A significant number of works on Ukrainian
executive governance have been published by Oleh Protsyk (see, for example,
‘Domestic political institutions in Ukraine and Russia and their responses to EU
enlargement’, 2003).  Finally, the book of Vesselin Dimitrov, Klaus Goetz and
Hellmut Wollman (2006) brings a fundamental analysis of the institutional legacies
and new challenges in the filed of central government reforms in Eastern European
countries. This source offers a supplementary analytical support for identification of
the way post-communist legacy shapes the process of Europeanisation of executive
governance.
The literature on political conditionality is quite vast, therefore only those
papers relevant for this research will be mentioned. Thus, studies of Heather Grabbe
(2006), Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004) as well as of Sabine
Zanger (2004) explain how EU influence worked in CEE. These papers would
represent a suitable source for drawing the main d eterminants in promoting
Europeanisation of executive governance in introductory theoretical chapter.
Also, one should mention primary sources: normative acts; documents
adopted by the leadership of both countries and official statements concerning the
above-mentioned issues from official websites of Moldova and Ukraine
(www.gov.md, www.rapc.gov.md, www.kmu.gov.ua, www.guds.gov.ua);
periodicals, newspapers and opinion polls; interviews with officials, policy -makers,
analysts and researchers in Moldova and Ukraine on topics relevant for the research.
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III. EUROPEANISATION OF EXECUTIVE GOVERNANCE IN
MOLDOVA
A. OVERVIEW OF THE MOLDOVAN EXECUTIVE
After gaining independence Moldova established a dual executive entrenched
in a semi-presidential system with a popularly elected president, who enjoys
extensive constitutional powers. After consulting the Parliament, the Pr esident is
entitled to designate the candidature for the office of Prime Minister. The head of
state has real possibilities for increasing executive power efficiency, as he/she can
suspend government acts coming in contradiction with legislation, reshuffle  the
cabinet, etc. Most of reform processes are based on presidential decrees, developed
later by government decisions. In absence of the EU conditionality, from the very
beginning European integration has been perceived by politicians and administrators
as a component of foreign policy. Thus the President often appears as the main policy
initiator on European integration, (Gheorghiu, 2005a, pp. 1 -2) given his powers in
foreign policy field. In 2000 Moldova shifted towards a parliamentary republic. Even
then, being elected by legislature, however, the President remains the main policy
initiator. First, constitutional amendments affected rather elections procedures than
presidential powers. Second, for the second term the Moldovan President is
combining the office of head of state and ruling party leader, which allows him to
exert influence on the Parliament.
The Government is entrusted to carry out the general management of public
administration, which, together with the head of the state , represents the executive
power of the country, performing both political and administrative functions. The
Government participates in development of political decisions necessary for
implementation or through preparing draft laws on the one hand, and approves its
own administrative decisions aimed at creating the organizational framework for
implementation of political decisions on the other hand.
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B. EU-MOLDOVA ACTION PLAN
Although negotiations’ closure on the new AP coincided with the 2004
enlargement, the EU-Moldova Action Plan (EU-MAP) was signed on 22 February
2005 only that is almost one year later. Due to Brussels’ regional approach Moldova
had to wait for negotiations with other countries to be concluded (Gheorghiu, 2005b,
p. 3).
The preamble mentions that ‘Enlargeme nt offers the opportunity to the EU
and Moldova to develop an increasingly close relationship, going beyond co -
operation, to involve a significant measure of economic integration and a deepening
of political co-operation.’ Although economic integration is emphasised while the
political field is restricted to ‘co -operation’, seven out of ten proclaimed priorities aim
the political dimension of the EU -Moldova cooperation process. The plan also
mentions EU’s acknowledgements of Moldova’s European aspirations a nd makes
reference to the Concept of Integration of the Republic of Moldova into the EU.
The plan puts adaptation pressure on executive from several perspectives.
First, 80 objectives and 294 actions (most of which aim internal reforms) distributed
in seven policy areas7 fall under incidence of government’s activity. Only some of
them, for example legislative harmonisation, involve a coordinated executive -
legislature effort.
Second, the EU-MAP’s structure corresponds to the Copenhagen criteria
(Gheorghiu, 2005b, p. 3) which occasionally determines the Moldovan Government
to operate as an executive of a candidate state.
Third, the plan involves Government’s modernisation. Thus, it stipulates  the
following priorities: ‘further strengthening the stability an d effectiveness of
institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law’ and further reinforcing
administrative capacity. Also , under ‘Political dialogue and reforms chapter’ it
encourages continuation of administrative reform (EU -MAP, 2005).
The EU-MAP is a short-term policy document; it has an implementation term
of three years, which is less than in case of agreements with candidate countries. This
7 Political dialogue and reform; co-operation for the settlement of the  Transnistrian conflict; economic
and social reform and development; trade -related issues, market and regulatory reform; co -operation in
Justice and Home Affairs; transport, energy, telecommunications, environment, and research,
development and innovation;  and people-to-people contacts.
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is not a legal act, a drawback that the Moldovan Government tried to oust by adopting
it by a decision in order to consolidate the AP as a national strategic policy paper
(Government Resolution, 2005a). Its likeliness with association agreements based on
Copenhagen criteria would be an opportunity for the Moldovan Government, but it is
weakened by absence of  clear benchmarks in appreciating the progress (Gheorghiu,
2005b). Despite all these facts, however, the EU-MAP offers a favourable framework
for strengthening government structures thus making them able to implement
European integration policies and to tr anspose and implement the acquis
communautere, which could lead to fulfilment of membership criteria.
C. MANAGEMENT OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
1. Structures
An efficient management of European affairs is a difficult task especially for
small countries like Moldova because they have to mobilize comparably more
administrative resources than bigger states  have to. Since 2002, there have been
significant changes in the organizational structure of executive, in order to establish
the Moldova’s European integration  coordination system. The first attempt to
coordinate efforts of executive structures came quite late. On 13 November 2002, the
Moldovan President decreed the formation of the National Commission for European
Integration (NCEI) (President of the R. Moldova , 2002). Following the Presidential
Decree, NCEI was established to pursue two major goals:
1. Draft the Strategy of European Integration of the Republic of Moldova
and submit it for Parliament’s approval;
2. Draft and approve the plan of actions designed to fac ilitate the Strategy
of European Integration of the Republic of Moldova and coordination of its further
implementation.
Under Article 3 of the presidential decree, ‘the European integration policy
shall be carried out by one of the public administration i nstitutions to be established
in accordance with the law.’ NCEI consists of 30 members who represent mostly the
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Government, but includes also a limited number of MPs and representatives of local
government, and non-governmental sector.
The European Integration Department (EID), a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) subdivision has been created later under the Government resolution on 4
August 2003 (Government Resolution, 2003a) ‘in order to consolidate the powers of
national institutions in their activities and initiative in regard to integration of our
country into the European community, as well as to promote the strategy of
Moldova’s accession to the European Union’. The Department was established on the
basis of the European Integration Agency within the MFA and the National South -
Eastern Europe Stability Pact Bureau within the same ministry, and was empowered
to perform some of relevant functions of the Ministry of Economy (Government
Resolution, 2003b). Simultaneously with the establishment of EID, the G overnment
called on ministries and departments to establish European integration subdivisions
subordinated to them. While differences between number of employees and specific
sectoral European integration tasks of these structures is understandable, variat ions
between their authority levels puts some of them in a lower position, which is not
suitable for interministerial cooperation.
Later on, after signing the EU -MAP, Moldova established a national
coordination system traditional for candidate states. It fits into the Foreign minister
led system model (Lippert, Umbach and Wessels, 2001, p. 993). Thus, in 2005 the
MFA has been added the words ‘and European Integration’, and the minister has bee n
appointed as vice prime minister. The choice for such a system  has both positive and
negative aspects. On the one hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European
Integration (MFAEI) is perceived as neutral in interministerial conflicts that often
emerge. On the other hand, it strengthens the perception that Europe an integration is
rather a priority of foreign affairs than of home affairs. Illustrative is also the example
of European integration departments created within ministries by replacing former
ministerial departments for international relations.
As European integration issues request a cooperated effort of many ministries,
Moldova had also established an interministerial coordination mechanism. It resides
in four interministerial commissions, each having a ministry responsible for
coordination of other minis tries for implementation of the EU -MAP in four fields:
law and security (coordinator Ministry of Justice); socio -economic problems
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(coordinated by the Ministry of Economy and Commerce); infrastructure (Ministry of
Transport and Roads); cultural -humanitarian problems (Ministry of Education and
Youth). MFAEI appears as the main national coordinator (Government Resolution,
2005b). The drawback of this structure is that it amplifies the competition between
ministries for the same attributions. A similar problem  appears within the
coordination of foreign technical assistance. For the time being the responsibility for
coordinating technical assistance is divided between the Ministry of Economy and
Commerce and the Ministry of Finances (coordinating assistance for development)
and MFAEI (coordinating assistance for European integration). Attributions in this
field also have a prime vice prime minister and a coordinator from the presidential
office. This framework often conducts to overlaps of competencies.
Finally, an important role in management of European affairs is played by the
diplomatic mission of the Republic of Moldova to the EU, which would need a
strengthening of institutional capacities. Of course, it does not receive the same
pressure as diplomatic miss ions of candidate or member states, but a number of only
four diplomats could be insufficient in circumstances when Moldova cannot benefit
from a strong lobby in Brussels. Moreover, the diplomatic mission has been opened
quite late, in 2004. Before this th e EU-related tasks have been performed by
Moldovan embassy to Belgium. Embassies in Baltic States, whose experience in
European affairs is quite relevant for Moldova, given the common past, were opened
also late, in 2005 only.
2. Processes
Preparations for the EU-MAP proper implementation started long time before
the AP had been officially signed (Gheorghiu, 2005b, p. 5). The EU -MAP provisions
were further developed into a National Program for Action Plan Implementation
(NPAPI) which specifies the way, t ime frame and responsible institutions for
implementation of specific actions. The NPAP I, however repeats the mistakes of the
EU-MAP by avoiding naming responsible persons or institutions for the fulfilment of
specific tasks, or by vaguely formulating the time frame, for example ‘2006-2007’.
This approach is not productive, given the fact that the EU -MAP is a short term
document. The vagueness of the AP and lack of the EU conditionality lead to a
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fragmented tempo of work on European issues. Another importan t document that
serves as guideline for the Moldovan Government is the European Integration
Strategy of the Republic of Moldova. The strategy is structured similarly to
association strategies of former candidate countries: each policy field is analyzed
following the same pattern: legislative framework; institutional framework; current
problems; short and medium term priorities.
The Moldovan Government conceptualises Moldova’s way to the EU
membership through the ‘South -East European way’ (Gabanyi, 2006, p. 53). This
approach is the main red line of the Conception of European Integration of Moldova
into the EU. The main rationale for such an approach is the hope to be considered for
the EU membership within the Western Balkans 8 wave. It is accompanied not onl y by
attempts to prove that historically and geopolitically Moldova belongs to the South
Eastern Europe, but by policy prioritisation and changes in organisational structure as
well. At policy level, Moldova intensified bilateral and multilateral contacts with
South-East European countries and is involved in any regional initiatives that
comprise them. Thus it became a founding member of the South East European Co -
operation Initiative (1996); it participated as observer in the South East European Co -
operation Process (1999 and full member from 2006); member of the Stability Pact
for South Eastern Europe (2001) Central European Free Trade Agreement (2006)
(Gheorghiu, 2005a). Also, as mentioned above, the European Integration Department
of the MFAEI is structurally based on the former National South -Eastern Europe
Stability Pact Bureau. The EU has indirectly accepted this approach by referring to
the Conception in the preamble of the EU -MAP.
As opposite to Ukraine, the Moldovan Ministry of Justice did not face the
need to translate the acquis communautaire , because Romania, being candidate,
already did it. The language affinity between these two countries might quite useful
for twinning instruments.
The ‘way of doing things’ of Moldovan executive is characteris ed by an
excessive centralisation. The Government often performs improper tasks that
constitute responsibility of subordinated ministries or even local government (Popa,
2006). Problems that could be solved at a lower level are brought to central
executive’s agenda. This fact overloads the government and embarrasses
8 Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and the UN administration of Kosovo.
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concentrating on strategic tasks. This has projected on coordination of European
affairs system and is characteristic for other post -communist former candidates
(Laffan, 2003, p. 15) which does not feature precise rules and guidelines for the
management of European affairs.
3. Agents
The study of the Moldovan ‘EU cadre’ (Laffan, 2003, p. 16) is difficult
because of a lack of any official statistics on civil servants. Needless to say there are
no statistics on their studies, language and professional abilities. One could mention
only public authorities where these ‘boundary managers’ ( Ibidem) between national
and European level activate: MFAEI, especially the EID, European integration units
within ministries. Also some of them work with authorities dealing with border
management and immigration issues, as these fields constitute a special concern of
the EU, which has financed training sessions  for civil servants from these structures.
The lack of statistics are due partially to the fact that there is no national agency on
civil servants that would deal with civil service issues. Such a structure is traditional
for the EU member states. From European integration perspective these statistics are
vital in order to identify training necessities, both on general EU issues and sectoral in
fields exposed to adaptation pressures.
Working in a foreign language seems to be a problem for civil servants. Thus,
negotiations on the EU-MAP were difficult because each time when the European
Commission submitted proposals in English, they had to be translated in Romanian,
sent to ministries, after discussing them ministries were sending back their proposals,
which after being compiled had to be translated again in to English (Gheorgiu, 2005b,
p. 10).
Absence of an integrated strategy of European training of civil service is a
serious drawback which is partially compensated by attempts to introduce European
studies faculties and courses on European law within univer sities.
Usually, in former candidates, the EU cadre gains great experience from
negotiating agreements with the EU, management of accession and of EU funding
programmes (Laffan, 2003, p. 17). Moldova has been exposed to a limited extent to
this type of pressures (management of the EU funds and negotiation of the EU -MAP).
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The best place for developing the EU cadre is diplomatic missions but unfortunately
in some member states Moldova still has no embassies or consulates. Lack of
motivation and poor remunerat ion amplifies the EU personnel deficit, and civil
servants often resign in favour of projects funded by international donors. The impact
of this phenomenon on Moldova is more destructive because a small country means
less specialized persons in particular fields within administrative structures and when
a person leaves from a department in a ministry, the whole expertise leaves with him.
IV. EUROPEANISATION OF EXECUTIVE GOVERNANCE IN
UKRAINE
A. OVERVIEW OF THE UKRAINIAN EXECUTIVE
After becoming independent in 1991 Ukraine, as other former Soviet
republics also opted for semi-presidentialism. Very soon the popularly elected
President, combining large constitutional powers with informal political leverages
became dominant over other power branches and neut ralised attempts to create a
‘checks and balances’ system (Woczuk, 2004, p. 3). Government’s authority has long
been reduced as President had important powers of issuing decrees which by content
are similar with laws issued by legislature (Protsyk, 2003b, p. 3). This situation
resulted in a lack of transparency and accountability of executive. Anticipating that
2004 presidential elections will result in coming in power of a new pro -European
leadership, the former President Leonid Kuchma initiated constituti onal reforms in
order to weaken powers of the office of presidency. Strengthening Government and in
particular Prime Minister’s office on expense of presidency was the main
compromise between conflicting parties for a peaceful conclusion of the so -called
‘Orange Revolution’. By the time being Ukraine faces a power crisis characterized by
confrontation between the President Viktor Yuschenko and the Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovich which left marks on executive’s efforts on European integration.
Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic course, as discussed below, with emphasize on the ‘Atlantic’
component, is one of issues of this conflict, reflected in a dispute on foreign policy
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powers. It is less probable that, at list in a short -term perspective, the anticipated
parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2007 will help overcome the power
crisis.
B. EU-UKRAINE ACTION PLAN
An AP between the EU and Ukraine is not a new idea. The first attempt to
develop such a plan occurred back in 1994. Results of implementation of this
document are hardly known merely because of absence of any positive outcomes
(CPCFPU, 2004, p. 1). While negotiating a new AP within the ENP, Ukraine’s
position were: (I) a limited time frame (maximum three years); (II) the main objective
of this document should be paving the way to an association agreement; (III)
establishing of a Free Trade Area (FTA) between Ukraine and the EU (CPCFPU,
2004, p. 9). This was different from EU’s view. It had serious claims regarding the
time frame and membership preco nditions. Finally, parts found a compromise on
FTA and agreed on a three years term. However , EU’s position of not offering
membership remained unchanged ( Ibidem). During negotiations, EU officials
mentioned that reforms that should be implemented accordin g to the AP would need
to be fulfilled anyway if Ukraine was a candidate state (Wolczuk, 2004).
It was clear that Ukrainian elite did not like the idea of the ENP and they did
not like a vague document that does not offer a membership perspective. In abse nce
of an alternative, however, the new document was finally signed on 21 February
2005. After the Orange Revolution , there were attempts to renegotiate the document.
Thus, as Solonenko (2006, p. 47)  points out, ‘with the change of the domestic
situation following the Orange Revolution, the ENP Action Plan was called into
question by the new Ukrainian leadership which saw itself as a new democratic elite
and claimed that the document negotiated with the old leadership did not suit the
“new” Ukraine anymore.’
In many fields the EU-UAP’s provisions are similar to the EU -MAP. The
preamble also emphasizes ‘gradual economic integration and a deepening of political
cooperation’. Chapters’ structure is also similar as well as likeliness with association
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agreements. Provisions that concern modernisation of Ukrainian executive are mostly
word by word the same as those from the EU -MAP.
C. MANAGEMENT OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
1. Structures
All measures focused on establishment of an institutional framework for
European integration are based on presidential decrees. The first attempts are back in
1993 when the President Kravchuk, in order to organise negotiations for conclusion
of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, decreed creation of an
intergovernmental committee on cooperation with the EU. The next President of
Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, initiated further changes while, simultaneously , he was the
main brake on institutional development on European integration. As Wolczuk (2007,
p. 11) ascertains, under Kuchma Ukraine ’s European aspirations could be labelled
‘integration by declaration’. Thus he issued in June 1998 the decree ‘On Ukraine’s
Strategy of Integration into European Union’, which outlined an action plan in this
respect (President of Ukraine, 1998). Another e xecutive order issued in June 1999
‘On the Central Government Bodies Responsible for the Implementation of Ukraine’s
Strategy of Integration into European Union’ aimed the proper establishment of the
institutional framework. The MFA tried to endorse declar ations on Ukraine’s
European aspirations with foreign policy measures. These proved to be a difficult task
and did not have a significant impact on institutional framework. First, the main
source of these efforts were pro -European oriented officials of the  MFA. Second,
measures at international level were not backed by a domestic ‘reform balance sheet’.
Third, MFA’s position was relatively weak because of the dominant Presidential
Administration (Wolczuk, 2004, p. 14).
Further, a work division has been set  up. Thus the Ministry of Economy
became Ministry of Economy and European Integration  (MEEI), to be responsible for
economic issues of integration. Within the MFA a Department of European
Integration having a coordinating role has been created. As in Moldova, coordination
of technical assistance is disputed between several public authorities, especially
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between the MEEI and MFA. The Ministry of Justice has been assigned the task of
harmonisation of the Ukrainian legal system with that of the EU. Within Mini stry of
Justice in 2004 the State Department for Legal Approximation has been created,
whose main outcome by the end of 2006 was 30% of acquis communautaire
translated into Ukrainian (Wolczuk, 2007, p. 17). Also, European integration units
within most of ministries have been created, although there are significant differences
between them. Competition between all these structures further hastened poor
coordination of European integration issues (Wolczuk, 2004, p. 14).
A specific feature of the Ukrainian in stitutional framework is a ‘Euro -
Atlantic’ approach which resulted defence and security structures aiming NATO
membership with civilian institutions seeking joining of the EU. In January 2003 the
President disposed creation of the State Council for Europea n and Euro-Atlantic
Integration. This step brought more vagueness in the institutional system of European
integration because the Council included a limited number of ministers. Coordination
of European integration issues needs a wide effort involving all ministries. In
candidate countries, all ministries are expected to be involved in structural adaptation.
Probably for these reasons in November 2005 this structure was liquidated (President
of Ukraine, 2005b). Previously, in March 2005, it was replaced by a structure dealing
with interministerial coordination comprising vice ministers for almost all ministries
(Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2005).
Overall, the ‘wind of change’ of the Orange Revolution attempted to improve
the institutional framework. A n ew office of vice prime minister for European
integration was established. The fact that this was a minister without portfolio (and
subsequently lacking stuff, resources and authority) weakened the coordination
system (Solonenko, 2006). However, by trial -and-error method and by intensifying
contacts with EU institutions, members and candidate countries, the institutional
framework for European integration became more ‘EU sensitive’. As Protsyk (2003a,
p. 9) ascertains, ‘overall, the cabinets in Ukraine have  become increasingly assertive
on the issue of European integration. A high level of cabinet instability and lack of
internal coordination, however, constitute serious political problems that prevent the
cabinet in Ukraine from maintaining a systematic app roach on European matters.’
By the time being, it is quite difficult to categorize the Ukrainian coordination
system on European affairs within the classical typology: ‘prime-minister led’,
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‘foreign minister led’ and ‘in -between type’ (Lippert, Umbach and Wessels, 2001, pp.
992-993). This is due mainly to often cabinet reshuffles which entails changes in
European affairs system as well. Also, despite the fact that day -by-day coordination
of European integration issues is naturally an executive task, occasio nally, for
example before conclusion of an important agreement with the EU, or when an
important reform requested by the EU is postponed, presidency assumes a leading
role. One could say that most likely Ukraine has a mixed coordination system which
could latter develop in a Prime Minister led. Prime Minister Yanukovych is
attempting to assume control on country’s negotiations with the EU. The foreign
minister is also loosing initiative because of tensions between the President and the
Prime Minister, because according to legal provisions, foreign and defence ministers
are appointed by the President only, while other ministers are proposed by prime
minister and confirmed by Parliament.
2. Processes
The major policy initiatives on European integration come  from presidency.
Usually a presidential decree is followed by Government decisions that make
reference to presidential acts as to policy documents. Protsyk (2003a, p. 3) counted
more than 80 presidential decrees and orders on European integration and EU -
Ukraine cooperation matters. As he exemplifies, the 1998 presidential decree ‘On
Strategy of Ukraine of Integration into the European Union’ is cited in more than 20
normative acts like cabinet resolutions, ministries’ acts etc. Presidency’s impetus led
to cabinet’s subordinated role, although the latter has normatively stipulated levers
(Ibidem).
The policy-making process in this field could be characterised as
centralisation, which is being gradually replaced by formalisation. After the ‘Orange
Revolution’ the perception in Ukraine that European integration is exclusively a
foreign policy domain has been replaced with a comprehensive reform agenda
(Solonenko, 2006). Aiming to deal with issues such as lack of coordination and inter -
institutional competition,  many public authorities approved a set of rules and
guidelines on management of European affairs. For example, on 16 May 2006 the
Main Department of Civil Service of Ukraine (MDCSU) issued the decree ‘On Work
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Organization concerning Implementation of EU -Ukraine Action Plan’ (MDCSU,
2005b) containing details on: performer of action, project or draft of normative act;
responsible persons; institutions or persons that should be consulted regarding the
project and both interdepartmental and final deadlines for  project conclusion. The
second aspect of formalization is scrutinizing by the Ministry of Justice on
compliance of any draft law or departmental normative act with the EU legal norms.
One of the most explicit examples of ‘domestication’ of European integr ation policies
(Wolczuk, 2007, p. 17) is the annual ‘Road Map on the Implementation of the AP’
containing reform measures with precise deadlines and responsibilities.
Overall, the work of state structures on European integration issues is
characterized by the so-called ‘Euro-Atlantic’ approach. The reason for such an
approach is the belief that joining NATO represents a precondition, a kind of gate
towards the EU membership. The 2004 and 2007 enlargements are suitable examples
confirming this hypothesis. Al l 12 new member states joined NATO before becoming
EU members. Also, 25 out of 27 member states are currently NATO members. 9 The
weakness of such an approach has domestic roots. Recent opinion polls show that
majority of questioned Ukrainians are in favour  of EU membership, while they are
reticent to NATO association (Shumylo, 2006, p. 7).  NATO membership is a highly
debated issue in the Ukrainian society and a major issue in conflict between President
and Prime Minister. However, it is not a fact that sepa rating these two issues would
bring more efficiency into the national coordination system. Moreover, it proved to be
successful when applied by Baltic States which first joined NATO and later the EU.
3. Agents
Annually, every fifth Ukrainian civil serva nt (about 20%) resigns (MDCSU,
2005a, p. 6). One could consider two basic reasons explaining this phenomenon.
First, there is a low level of remuneration which naturally orients specialists towards
private sector or international projects. Second, there is  no merit-based promotion
system, based on open competition. Most of senior officials within civil service are
appointed, this type of designation being a traditional post -communist legacy.
9 Austria and Ireland are not NATO members.
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Given the fact that Ukraine belongs to the category of big states, effects of
cadre turnover are less damageable than they are for small countries. Big states have
more specialists working in the same field. A genuine ‘EU -cadre’ school are
diplomatic missions abroad. Ukraine opened diplomatic missions in member states
shortly after independence. The Mission of Ukraine to the EU has been opened in
1996. However a number of 12 diplomats only assigned to this mission is not enough
to effectively deal with Brussels’ machinery.
Given that ‘the state apparatus remains starved of skilled bureaucrats,
knowledgeable in various aspects of European integration’ (Wolczuk, 2004, p. 14),
the ‘Orange Revolution’ brought a different approach to civil service. The MDCSU is
maintaining a comprehensive database of civil servants, that allow s drawing of a
precisely targeted civil service reform. In 2005 the MDCSU prepared 42 draft laws
and subordinated normative acts aiming civil service reform and modernization. The
department focused its activity on several directions: general adaptation of  civil
service to European standards; civil servants work organization on EU -UAP
implementation; training in European and Euro -Atlantic affairs, including language
training (MDCSU website). Obviously, the Ukrainian ‘post -revolutionary’ power
crisis affected civil service as well, that become less focused on domestic reforms
agenda.
However, as Wolczuk (2007, p. 15) points out ‘the most important impact of
the AP in Ukraine has been the emergence of enclaves within bureaucracy, which
possess the necessary technocratic expertise, resources, professionalism and
connections with EU-level institutions, similar to what has been observed in the
candidate states’.  Overall, one could say that things are definitely moving forward.
Since the ‘Orange Revolution ,’ the legal framework on civil service has been widely
changed, modernized, and thus adapted to European requirements on civil service. Of
course, the importance of adopting good laws should not be overestimated. Preparing
good normative acts that are drawn on We stern standards and subsequently satisfy
external partners is hardly a half of work. Good laws without a proper implementation
are not a novelty for the post -soviet space.
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V. CHALLENGES IN EUROPEANISATION OF EXECUTIVE
GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Finding themselves independent, both Moldova and Ukraine opted for semi -
presidential systems, characterised by the dominant role of a president elected by
popular vote. This choice concentrated policy initiative powers, inclusively on
European integration, in presidency’s hands. It seems that such a system, especially in
republics that recently escaped from a totalitarian regime, offers fewer possibilities
for a reciprocal checks and balances institutional framework. Being the main
initiators of European integration policies, presidents are simultaneously their main
brakes. This situation replicates to lower levels of administration, where senior and
junior civil servants, in spirit of the best communist traditions, are guided by  the
principle ‘forbidden if  not ordered’. After a decade of experiments, however, hoping
to benefit from a more accountable political environment, Moldova and Ukraine
shifted towards a parliamentary regime, characteristic for most of the EU members.
Assessment of the EU impact on t he two countries’ executives reveals the
following findings. In terms of institutional framework , both countries established
systems for coordination of European affairs similar to those of candidate countries: a
national coordination structure, interminis terial working groups, European integration
units within ministries. As opposite to candidate countries, Moldova and Ukraine
strengthened this framework without being exposed to membership conditionality.
Moldova chose a classical foreign minister -led system with a European Integration
Department within the MFAEI. This model has both positive and negative aspects.
Given the nature of its work, the MFAEI being focu sed primarily on foreign policy  is
perceived as neutral in interministerial conflicts which oft en occur in candidate
countries. The fact that he is simultaneously vice prime minister gives him more
authority for playing the coordinating role. Another basic model is a Prime Minister
led system, which is characteristic to candidate countries close to membership, when
the chief of cabinet aims to assume control over European integration issues in order
to gain political authority (Verheijen, 2000, p. 37). In this case one could obtain more
authority in solving interministerial conflicts and promptness in coordination and
decision-taking. There is also an in -between type with a quasi -independent
coordination structure. Usually , this is a separated Ministry of European Integration
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or a (vice prime) minister of European integration without portfolio. In thi s case one
opts for neutrality, independence and freedom of initiative. Ukraine, most probably,
fits into this last type, although changes are frequent, due to instability caused by
power crisis. In some candidate countries, for example Poland, the coordin ation
system also often changed (Lippert, Umbach and Wessels, 2001, p. 994). Some
candidates even experienced all three models. Also in both countries a standardization
of European integration units within ministries would be required. Their authority
status should be equalized in order to improve interministerial cooperation.
While the institutional framework on coordination of European affairs is
similar to candidate countries, in terms of processes involved, however, there is a lack
of efficiency.  Speaking about coordination styles , Moldova tends toward a
centralisation style, while Ukraine involved a mixture between formalisation and
centralisation (Laffan, 2003, p. 14). In absence of membership conditionality, both
countries tried to elaborate the Eur opean affairs processes on a main rationale – a
‘remote beacon’ that would give a membership hope to administrators that perform
the day-to-day work. For Moldova this is the ‘South -Eastern European way’ and for
Ukraine is the ‘European and Euro -Atlantic integration’. While the first approach has
more credibility, as it does not involve significant budgetary expenditures and major
Moldovan political parties neither accept nor deny it, the Ukrainian one is a highly
debated issue in conflict between the Presid ent and the Prime Minister as it involves a
military component. NATO membership does not enjoy a large population support,
especially of Eastern regions that traditionally had pro -Russian attitudes. However, it
is not a fact that escaping from this approac h would make the coordination system
more efficient, as though the major issues in this conflict by no means concern
foreign policy issues (Wolczuk, 2007, p. 12).
The unreasonable centralisation stemming from presidential leadership
inhibits policy initiat ives at lower levels of administration. Attempts to obtain a more
accountable system failed in both countries. In Moldova because the ‘double -hated’
situation of the head of state – chairman of the ruling party and President, which gives
him more authority, even if the constitutional order has been changed into a
parliamentary republic. In Ukraine constitutional changes degenerated in a power
crisis. In both countries there are no mechanisms of accountability for cases when
required actions regarding Europe an integration were not performed.
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In terms of agents of change – civil servants – that systematically work on
European affairs, in Ukraine the turnover proves to be high. Moldova lacks such kind
of statistics, but one could assume that situation is simila r because of the low level of
work remuneration. However, working on European integration involves prestige and
opportunities for career development. European integration issues are coordinated
within ministries of foreign affairs, where personnel could be  motivated by the
possibility of being sent in a diplomatic mission. Establishment of certain institutions
and units within institutions working on European integration led to creation within
some of them of ‘islands of excellence’ – teams of civil servants that obtained a
specific expertise learning from candidate and member states experience and were
successful in performing certain tasks. A next move for Moldova and Ukraine would
be to keep the institutional memory accumulated in this way and to extend t hese
success stories to other institutions.
As Genschel (2001, p. 98) points out ‘similar external pressures lead to similar
institutional responses’. The answer to the question where these responses could lead
to is the concept of path-dependency: ‘the influence of historical choices on present
institutional options’ (Kelley, 2006, p. 30). Whether a country that has vague
perspectives for the EU membership but behaviours like a candidate state and
implements all necessary reforms, it will experience an inc reasing convergence with
member states and there would be no reasons for this state to remain outside the club.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper analysed the process of Europeanization focusing on two European
countries that are beyond EU candidacy, but which , according to the Treaty of the
European Union, could request to advance their status. While the research scope is
narrow, and it analyzes one institution in -depth, the paper contributes to
Europeanisation research in several ways. First, it contributes to the ‘top-down’
Europeanisation research, which tries to capture the impact of the EU on domestic
policies and institutions. Second, studying Europeanisation process in Moldova and
Ukraine contributes to the study of this discipline ‘further East’, in non -member states
from Eastern Europe thus covering gaps in Europeanisation research from a
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geographical perspective. Finally, analysis of Europeanisation of executive
governance in this region is required in academic scholarship  in order to asses how
the EU hits domestic institutions using enlargement patterns without membership
conditionality.
To conclude, first, one foresee s detachment of a new branch of
Europeanisation research that concerns Eastern European countries whose
clarification of membership pers pective has been delayed for an undetermined time.
These countries10 would like to join the EU, but are not encouraged (as opposed to
EEA countries, that would be encouraged but do not want). For Ukraine, the
‘uncoordinated implementation of EU conditionali ty’ has been conceptualised by
Wolczuk (2007, p. 23) as ‘sporadic Europeanisation – that is enactment of the EU-
defined reform agenda which is localised, unsystematic and often shallow’. Given
similarities in Europeanisation of domestic governance identifi ed within this paper,
this approach is well-suited to Moldova as well.
Second, changes in the governance structure of Moldova and Ukraine show
typical patterns of candidate countries. National coordination systems of European
affairs have been put in place  (with a leading structure within the MFA,
interministerial coordination committees, institutional framework for legislative
approximation and coordinating technical assistance, European integration units
within ministries) and teams of ‘EU cadres’ are bei ng created of civil servants within
institutions mostly exposed to adaptation pressures.  Nevertheless, in terms of
pressures, there are certain elements emerging from the communist past, which are
against the EU norms and principles, such as over -centralisation, lack of
transparency, reactive approaches to ‘ways of doing things’.
However, this type of problems occur  occasionally in EU member states as
well.  Also, reluctance and selective approaches in reforming executive governance in
Moldova and Ukraine stems not only from the totalitarian past but from the lack of
clarity what are partners’ goals. The bilateral action plans are based on Copenhagen
criteria but they do not have clear benchmarks in order to identify when a reform
measure has been fully implemented, thus offering room for interpretations. Even
10 Especially Moldova and Ukraine but for future Belarus could be considered as well a s countries
from Southern Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – whose location in Europe still remains
questionable, and whose ‘European future’ depends, besides significant oil resources in this region, on
membership perspective of Turkey.
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leaving aside the wish of two countries to join the EU as full members, the ENP
approach of offering to Moldova and Ukraine ‘everything but institutions’ is not
properly translated into practice. Exce pt EU-level institutions, it is supposed that the
EU and neighbours have to share the four freedoms: free movement of persons,
services, goods and capitals.  Even in this field, however, the EU is evasive, without
saying explicitly what has to be done, how to measure progress, what are the time
frames by when ENP partners could be fully involved in these mechanisms.
Thus, the raison d’être of europeanising national governments in Moldova
and Ukraine are clear from EU’s perspective only: stability and securi ty in the
Eastern neighbourhood. This is confirmed by the European Commission (2004)
which aims ‘to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European
Union.’ One could seem that for both examined countries the raison d’être of
Europeanisation of domestic institutions could well be the creation of a framework
for modernisation. However, modernisation is not always synonym with
Europeanisation, the latter often implying structural adjustments in order to reach
convergence with EU structure s. Thus Moldovan and Ukrainian governments have to
double their efforts in order to perform their day -to-day duties, and they have to focus
on alleviation of poverty, economic grow, modernisation while facing communist
legacy and external pressures, coming  both from East and West. The main question
that remains is can one have good neighbours using the same strategy as for obtaining
good members? Is it feasible using ‘sticks’ without even showing ‘carrots’? While for
the EU the raison d’être for Europeanisation of Moldova and Ukraine coincides with
its finalite, the latter is not clear for these two countries. What happens if, say, during
a ten-year period their institutions become convergent with those of the EU member
states and why not to hasten this process by making it more uniform and efficient?
Hopefully partial answers to this question will be found in the new framework for
cooperation to be established after the conclusion of Action Plans implementation.
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